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Courts have long honored the fundamental principle that the
right to full and fair litigation assumes the unobstructed availabil-
ity of evidence.' When the divulgence of information in court
threatens interests or relationships of sufficient social importance,
however, courts have recognized a compelling justification for sac-
rificing the free flow of evidence and have created rules of privi-
lege.2 Since 1972, when Congress extended Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 19641 to academic institutions,4 colleges and univer-
sities increasingly have faced broad discovery requests for confi-
dential personnel files by plaintiffs alleging that discriminatory
factors such as sex, race, or age played an impermissible role in the
institution's employment decisions.' In response, some institutions
have asked the courts, with mixed success, to recognize a new priv-
ilege for personnel files and tenure review committee materials
based upon the fundamentals of academic freedom.6
This Recent Development considers whether the federal
courts should recognize a qualified privilege for the discovery of
peer review materials in litigation brought by university educators
denied employment, tenure, or promotion based on what they al-
lege are impermissible discriminatory grounds. Part II examines
the underlying rationale for establishing an academic freedom
privilege, focusing on the Constitution, statutes, judicial rules, and
the common law as possible bases of support. Part II also examines
1. See, e.g., United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (stating that "the public
... has a right to every man's evidence").
2. See, e.g., In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426, 430 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S.
1106 (1982); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 72, at 171 (3d ed. 1984).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
4. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 3, 86 Stat. 103
(1972). Prior to this amendment, academic employees had to demonstrate a violation of civil
rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, or 1985. See, e.g., Holliman v. Martin, 330 F. Supp. 1
(W.D. Va. 1971). This requirement virtually foreclosed a right of action by private college or
university employees unable to make the requisite showing of state action leading to denial
of their civil rights. See, e.g., Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding
that alleged sex discrimination in employment practice by a private university did not
amount to state action because the university was not performing a "public function" by
providing education).
5. See, e.g., McKillop v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 386 F. Supp. 1270 (N.D. Cal. 1975)
(in which the plaintiff sought all papers, letters, forms, reports, and other documents in-
cluded in a university's personnel files concerning her hiring, evaluation, promotion, and
denial of tenure, as well as all written materials in the files of past and present tenure-
tracked personnel in her department who were either granted or denied tenure).
6. See, e.g., EEOC v. University of Notre Dame du Lac, 715 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1983);
In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
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plaintiffs' ability to rebut any presumption of privilege recognized
by the court. Part III discusses the inconsistencies in recent judi-
cial responses to the disputed privilege. Part IV argues that the
existing split among the federal circuits provides inadequate guid-
ance for the lower courts faced with claims of privilege and sug-
gests a two-step analysis to determine in each case whether a privi-
lege should be recognized. Part V concludes that federal courts
should adopt a qualified privilege based upon academic freedom to
require the courts to balance the conflicting interests of academic
freedom and freedom from discrimination.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Federal Rules of Evidence govern the discovery of privi-
leged information in the federal courts.7 The current rule of privi-
lege, however, differs from the original proposal. The proposed
rules allowed only those privileges required by the Constitution or
federal statutes or included in the rules themselves.8 Fearing that
the proposed rule would freeze the law of privilege, Congress
adopted a new rule allowing courts to develop rules of privilege on
a flexible, case-by-case basis.' Federal Rule of Evidence 501 states
that in the federal courts:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution. . . Act of Congress or...
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court . . . , the privilege of a witness, per-
son, government, State, or political subdivision. . . shall be governed by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience.1 0
7. The United States Supreme Court in February 1972 promulgated a code of eviden-
tiary rules for the federal courts. Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magis-
trates, 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972). Under the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982), the
code was to become effective in 90 days barring congressional disapproval in the interim.
Facing a barrage of criticism leveled at the proposed rules, however, Congress intervened by
delaying the effective date of the rules of evidence until they were "expressly approved by
Act of Congress." Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (1973).
8. See Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates 501, 56 F.R.D.
at 230-58. The proposed privilege section, listing only nine specific privileges, generated
more comment and controversy than any other section of the proposed rules. 120 CONG. REC.
40, 891 (1974) (remarks of Rep. William L. Hungate of Missouri, principal author of the
federal Rules of Evidence).
9. See 120 CONG. REc. 40,891 (1974) (remarks of Rep. William L. Hungate).
10. FED. R. EVID. 501. The quoted language applies in federal criminal cases and in
civil actions "unless State law supplies the rule of decision for a claim or defense, or for an
element of a claim or defense" in which case Rule 501 requires application of state privilege
law. 120 CONm. REc. 40,891 (1974) (remarks of Rep. William L. Hungate); FED. R. EWD. 501.
Although some courts have decided claims of privilege in academic discrimination cases
under state law, see, e.g., McKillop v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 386 F. Supp. 1270 (N.D. Cal.
1975), the majority have viewed claims brought under Title VII or 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983,
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Rule 501 clearly grants the federal courts the power to recognize
new privileges." Even so, the judiciary has been reluctant to exer-
cise that power. 2 Nevertheless, Rule 501 requires courts at least to
consider four possible grounds as the basis for recognition of new
evidentiary privileges: the Constitution, federal statutes, Supreme
Court rules, and the principles of common law.
13
A. A Constitutional Privilege Based on Academic Freedom
Academic freedom denotes a belief that new theories and hy-
potheses must be generated and explored in an academic arena un-
restrained by society's entrenchment in the status quo.' 4 Histori-
cally, Americans have regarded open intellectual discourse in a free
marketplace of ideas as an essential element in the preservation of
meaningful educational forums vital to the continuation of an in-
formed populace.' 5 Although academic freedom is not expressly
guaranteed by the Constitution, 6 the Supreme Court has deemed
the freedom to disseminate information, theories, and ideas in the
realm of academia to be "a special concern of the First Amend-
ment. ' 17 Academic freedom, therefore, may provide a constitu-
tional basis upon which to formulate an evidentiary privilege for
the educational community.'
The Supreme Court's first clear articulation of the protected
status of academic thought 9 came in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,'
20
and 1985 as invoking both federal question jurisdiction and the federal privilege rules.
11. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980) (commenting that the
purpose of Rule 501 is "to leave the door open to change").
12. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (stating that "exceptions to
the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for
they are in derogation of the search for truth"); In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d at 430 (finding
"notable hostility" in judicial responses to proposed new privileges).
13. FED. R EVID. 501.
14. See Comment, Academic Freedom vs. Title VII: Will Equal Opportunity Be De-
nied on Campus?, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 989, 993 (1981).
15. Id.
16. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (stating that
"[a]cademic freedom . . . [is] not a specifically enumerated constitutional right").
17. Id.; Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); see also Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) (declaring that "the vigilant protection of constitutional
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools").
18. See generally Note, Preventing Unnecessary Intrusions on University Autonomy:
A Proposed Academic Freedom Privilege, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1538, 1544-55 (1981). First
amendment academic freedom, however, does not provide a blanket privilege for all areas of
academic life. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. FBI, 111 F.R.D. 432, 441 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (refusing to
recognize a constitutional privilege of donors not to reveal documents placed in archives
under a restricted access agreement).
19. Note, supra note 18, at 1545; see also Comment, supra note 14, at 994. Justice
1400 [Vol. 40:1397
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in which the Court upheld a university professor's right to with-
hold the contents of one of his lectures from a state committee
investigating subversive activities. Chief Justice Warren, speaking
for a plurality of the Court, stated that forcing the professor to
disclose the information would be an infringement on his academic
freedom and liberty of political expression, areas on which "gov-
ernment should be extremely reticent to tread."21 Justice Frank-
furter's concurrence provides a clear statement of the role of gov-
ernment and the courts, suggesting that academic inquiries and
speculations should be left as free from restrictions as possible.2"
Of perhaps greater significance in the employment context, how-
ever, is Justice Frankfurter's use of a statement made by a group
of South African scholars emphasizing the university's need to fos-
ter an atmosphere conducive to speculation, experimentation, and
creation.23 The scholars had stated that in such an atmosphere
"four essential freedoms '24 must prevail: a university must be free
to determine on academic grounds who may teach, what may be
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to
study.26
Frankfurter, joined by Justice Douglas, concurring in the Court's earlier decision in Wieman
v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 194-98 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), discussed academic
freedom in a constitutional framework in upholding a university professor's right to refuse
to take a "loyalty oath" to retain his position. Frankfurter noted:
[11n view of the nature of the teacher's relation to the effective exercise of the rights
which are safeguarded by the Bill of Rights and by the Fourteenth Amendment, inhibi-
tion of freedom of thought, and of action upon thought, in the case of teachers brings
the safeguards of those amendments vividly into operation.
Id. at 195.
20. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
21. Id. at 250. Chief Justice Warren went on to stress the crucial role of academic
freedom in a democracy:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is almost self-
evident. . . . To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges
and universities would imperil the future of our Nation. . . . Scholarship cannot flour-
ish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always
remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understand-
ing; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.
Id.
22. Id. at 262 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter stated that "[p]olitical
power must abstain from intrusion into this activity of freedom, pursued in the interest of
wise government and the people's well-being, except for reasons that are exigent and obvi-
ously compelling." Id.
23. See id. at 263.
24. Id. (quoting The Open Universities in South Africa 10-12, a statement by a con-




The Court reaffirmed the protected status of academic con-
cerns in Keyishian v. Board of Regents. 26 Justice Brennan, in an
opinion striking down a state statute that required teachers to
swear an oath that they had never been members of the Commu-
nist Party, stressed the importance of protecting academic free-
dom. The Court noted that government regulation in the area of
academic freedom should be narrow and specific.2 7 A similar view
prevailed in the Court's most recent delineation of the constitu-
tional nature of academic freedom in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke.2 s
As one commentator has noted, however, the principle of aca-
demic freedom may be bifurcated into individual and institutional
components.2 9 That commentator finds the right of an individual
instructor to discourse freely upon the topics of his choice,
shielded from either administrative or governmental interference,
to be a frequently asserted and widely accepted constitutional
right.30 Because the institution itself is threatened when a court
orders production of confidential employment files during litiga-
tion, however, the less developed institutional branch must form
the constitutional basis for a possible evidentiary privilege.31
Although a majority of the Supreme Court never has expressly
rejected or recognized "institutional" academic freedom, the "four
essential freedoms" put forth by Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy
32
and adopted by Justice Powell in Bakke33 emphasize the right of
an institution as an entity to determine who may teach and what
subjects may be taught. Further, federal cases have shown marked
deference toward universities' decisions concerning students34 and
26. 385 U.S. 589, 602-04 (1967).
27. Id. at 604 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963)).
28. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Justice Powell, in the Court's lead opinion, cited with ap-
proval the "four essential freedoms" set out in Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence.
Id. at 312. Powell further reiterated that academic freedom, "though not a specifically enu-
merated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amend-
ment." Id.
29. See Note, supra note 18, at 1546-51; see also Cooper v. Ross, 472 F. Supp. 802, 813
(E.D. Ark. 1979) (stating that the right "involves a fundamental tension between the aca-
demic freedom of the individual teacher to be free of restraints from the university adminis-
tration, and the academic freedom of the university to be free of government, including
judicial, interference").
30. See Note, supra note 18, at 1546.
31. Id. at 1546-47.
32. 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
33. 438 U.S. at 312.
34. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 106 S. Ct. 507, 513-14 (1985) (grant-
ing university faculty broad deference in review of a student's academic dismissal); Board of
1402 [Vol. 40:1397
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employment based on academic grounds. More recent cases, how-
ever, have illustrated the courts' increasing willingness to address
discrimination claims in suits arising from academic personnel de-
cisions." The shift is largely the result of criticism directed at the
judiciary's perceived failure to follow Congress' mandate that Title
VII be extended to academic employers.3 7 Given the growing par-
ticipation of the judiciary, then, the courts now must face the issue
of the breadth and depth of discovery of confidential employee
files to be allowed plaintiffs in academic discrimination suits. In
this context, some academic defendants have begun to assert, with
varying degrees of success, a privilege based on constitutional
grounds. Courts, in considering such claims, are required to bal-
ance carefully the competing needs of the litigants and to order
disclosure only when justice demands.3 "
Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 92 (1978) (declaring that "courts are
particularly ill-equipped to evaluate academic performance").
35. See, e.g., Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1974). This sex discrimi-
nation suit was filed by a female medical school instructor who was not rehired. The Second
Circuit affirmed the district court's acceptance of the university's claim that budget re-
straints necessitated the decision not to rehire, noting its own lack of expertise in reviewing
the qualifications of faculty members. The court articulated a "hands-off" philosophy, stat-
ing that, "[olf all fields .. .which the federal courts should hesitate to invade and take
over, education and faculty appointments at a University level are probably the least suited
for federal court supervision." Id. at 1231-32. For other examples of courts refusing to con-
sider the merits of faculty complaints, see Clark v. Whiting, 607 F.2d.634, 638 (4th Cir.
1979); Huang v. College of the Holy Cross, 436 F. Supp. 639, 653 (D. Mass. 1977); Johnson v.
University of Pittsburgh, 435 F. Supp. 1328, 1353-54 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Keddie v. Pennsylva-
nia State Univ., 412 F. Supp. 1264, 1270 (M.D. Pa. 1976).
36. See, e.g., Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1980); Jepsen v.
Florida Bd. of Regents, 610 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1980); Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d
1150 (2d Cir. 1978). In Kunda the Third Circuit overruled the university's decision and
reinstated the plaintiff, awarding not only back pay but also the previously denied tenured
status.
37. In Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1978), the Second Circuit at-
tempted to repair some of the precedential damage caused by its broad deference to the
university's decision in Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1974). In explaining
that its previous cautious stance did not advocate absolute judicial nonintervention, the
court stated:
This anti-interventionist policy has rendered colleges and universities virtually immune
to charges of employment bias, at least when that bias is not expressed overtly. We
fear, however, that the common-sense position we took in Faro, namely that courts
must be ever-mindful of relative institutional competences, has been pressed beyond
all reasonable limits, and may be employed to undercut the explicit legislative intent of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [Title VII].
Powell, 580 F.2d at 1153.
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in Jepsen v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 610 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir.
1980), stated that "caution against intervention in a university's affairs cannot be allowed to
undercut the explicit legislative intent of Title VII." Id. at 1383.
38. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978) (opinion of
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
B. Protection for Universities Based on Supreme Court Rules
In the absence of a federal statute protecting an educational
institution's confidential employment files during discovery, 9 Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 501 directs the academic defendant seeking a
shield to search the rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.40 Ac-
cording to the liberal discovery rules of the federal courts,
41
"[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privi-
leged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pend-
ing action. ' 42 The Supreme Court has stated, however, that the re-
quirement of relevance should be strictly applied.43 Further, a
court in its discretion may grant a protective order prohibiting dis-
covery of even relevant, nonprivileged material when necessary to
protect a party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or
undue burden or expense.44 Moreover, a court, through its control
over the sequence and timing of discovery, may direct a litigant to
exhaust all possible alternative sources for the desired material
before ordering compliance with a motion to compel discovery of
confidential information.45
In Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons46
the plaintiffs sought discovery of confidential review files used in
excluding the plaintiffs from membership in a medical professional
organization. 47 The Seventh Circuit noted that a court considering
a Rule 26(c) motion to limit discovery in the face of a plaintiff's
request for confidential information must compare the relative
Justice Powell) (stating that even where legitimate academic considerations are involved,
"individual rights may not be disregarded").
39. See Kroll, Title IX Sex Discrimination Regulations: Private Colleges and Aca-
demic Freedom, 13 URB. L. ANN. 107, 115 n.44 (1977).
40. FED. R. EVID. 501.
41. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979) (holding that "discovery rules
are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment to effect their purpose of adequately in-
forming the litigants in civil trials").
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
43. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 177.
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). The Court in Herbert v. Lando stated that "[w]ith this au-
thority at hand, judges should not hesitate to exercise appropriate control over the discovery
process." 441 U.S. at 177.
45. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d); see, e.g., Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Sur-
geons, 726 F.2d 1150, 1161 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 470 U.S. 373
(1985). The court in Marrese noted that, "[oif course, if the plaintiffs do not need anything
beyond the ... [confidential] files to prove their case, they cannot be asked to do any other
discovery before getting access to the files." Id.
46. 726 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 470 U.S. 373
(1985).
47. Id. at 1151-52.
1404 [Vol. 40:1397
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burdens that an adverse decision would impose on each party.48
The court directed that both the nature of the hardship and its
magnitude be weighed, with emphasis given to interests having a
value more social than private.49 Further, the judge must consider
the possibility that a carefully crafted protective order may recon-
cile the competing interests. The same analysis applies under
Rule 26(d); however, the court stated that an order merely post-
poning a discovery request may be granted more freely than one
denying the request altogether.51
Some courts have advocated the use of a combination of Rule
26(c) protective orders52 and orders aimed at protecting confidenti-
ality in the academic context through in camera review, sealing of
records, redaction or use of assumed names, and strict control over
copies. 3 However, reliance upon the judicial discretion granted in
the rules of civil procedure provides uncertain, and therefore un-
satisfactory, protection for the universities' interest in confidential-
ity.54 The use of protective orders to create a protected status for
confidential materials sought in discovery is at once an awkward
and contrived twisting of the true purpose behind the rule-the
prevention of bad faith or abusive, unreasonable discovery re-
quests.5 5 Further, the discretionary basis of the rule forces univer-
48. Id. at 1159.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. The court directed that on remand the district court should follow the proce-
dure adopted in its recent decision in EEOC v. University of Notre Dame du Lac, 715 F.2d
331, 338-39 (7th Cir. 1983). In Notre Dame the court ordered the files of faculty tenure
deliberations redacted to remove names and information identifying committee members
and directed the district judge to review the files in camera. If the redacted files contained
incriminating material, the plaintiff's attorney could request that the judge divulge the
names of the members so that they might be deposed. Id. at 338.
52. See, e.g., Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579, 581 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 904 (1977).
53. See, e.g., Notre Dame, 715 F.2d at 338-39; Guerra v. Board of Trustees of Cal.
State Univ., 567 F.2d 352, 355 (9th Cir. 1977); Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977).
54. But see Lee, Balancing Confidentiality and Disclosure in Faculty Peer Review:
Impact of Title VII Litigation, 9 J.C. & U.L. 279, 309 (1982-83) (arguing that the federal
rules already allow trial judges to use a balancing test "nearly identical to that used when a
qualified privilege is raised," nullifying any need for recognizing a new privilege); Comment,
An Academic Freedom Privilege in the Peer Review Context: In re Dinnan and Gray v.
Board of Higher Education, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 286, 345 (1983) (suggesting that discretion-
ary application of the discovery rules might provide a better solution given judicial reluc-
tance to recognize privileges).




sities to convince the court in each instance that the files are wor-
thy of a judicial shield, 56 resulting in expensive, time-consuming
litigation. Finally, because the use of Rule 26(c) would provide no
certainty of confidentiality for the reviewing parties, it would fail
to foster honest, open criticism of faculty members under review.
Indeed, the institution's fear of possible future litigation5 7 might
actually facilitate ad hoc, discriminatory employment decisions
without full consideration of the applicant's merits and without
the benefit of accurate written records.
C. Common Law Privilege
Should the courts refuse to recognize a privilege based on con-
stitutional principles, statutes, or Supreme Court rules, Rule 501
instructs the judiciary to consider "principles of common law...
interpreted . . . in the light of reason and experience.15  Federal
common law principles provide that privileges from discovery
should be cautiously created and narrowly construed. 9 Thus, evi-
dentiary privileges should be recognized only to the extent that the
refusal to testify or produce relevant evidence carries a social bene-
fit that transcends the acknowledged need to employ all available
means in ascertaining the truth. 0
Professor Wigmore's classic analysis suggests that a privileged
status may arise only upon the satisfaction of four fundamental
conditions:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and sat-
isfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communication must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the cor-
rect disposal of litigation.'
56. See Note, supra note 18, at 1544.
57. Id.
58. FED. R. EvID. 501.
59. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (holding that "exceptions to
the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for
they are in derogation of the search for truth").
60. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
61. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285 (McNaughton rev. ed.
1961) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). Wigmore notes that "[t]here is ... author-
ity for a 'qualified privilege' protecting against disclosure of the identities of academicians
participating in a peer review process in connection with promotion or tenure procedures at
a college or university." Id. § 2286 (Supp. 1986) (footnote omitted) (citing EEOC v. Univer-
1406 [Vol. 40:1397
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One recent commentator, in his consideration of a common law
based privilege, has reformulated Wigmore's test,6" noting that
courts typically consider three main factors in assessing a common
law privilege claim: (1) the need for relevant facts to be fully dis-
closed; (2) the importance to society of the interest that the privi-
lege seeks to protect; and (3) the need for protecting the interest
through the use of an evidentiary privilege." In determining
whether peer review material is to be presumptively privileged,
then, courts must balance the plaintiff's need for the information
in pursuit of successful litigation, taking into consideration the
plaintiff's ability to obtain the evidence through less intrusive
means, with the defendant's interest in maintaining open and can-
did evaluation of faculty in pursuit of its academic goals, taking
into consideration the danger of illicit discrimination being buried
under a subterfuge of confidentiality protestations.
When examining the merits of the claimed common law aca-
demic privilege, a court must focus initially upon the interests of
the plaintiff in discrimination litigation. Weighing heavily in favor
of the plaintiff's discovery requests is the strong common law tra-
dition that favors the free accessibility of evidence 64 to promote
the fair adjudication of competing claims. This tradition is further
embodied in the liberal discovery rules for the federal courts. 5
Moreover, Congress' 1972 extension of Title VII specifically to in-
clude academic employers 8 mandates that the courts promote
sity of Notre Dame du Lac, 715 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1983)). But see 23 C. WRIGHT & K.
GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5431 (1980 & Supp. 1986) (recog-
nizing decisional authority for the privilege, but stating that "there are a great many pres-
ently unprivileged relationships that have a better claim on judicial creativity than the com-
bination of back-scratching and character assassination that too often passes for peer review
in academic institutions").
62. Note, supra note 18, at 1556.
63. Id. The writer suggests that Wigmore's factors are very similar to those pro-
pounded in his own test. Id. at 1556 n.120.
Some courts also have examined whether the nine privileges spelled out in the proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence include the privilege claimed in the current litigation, viewing the
proposals as a reflection of dominant common law analysis. The proposed rules are useful
only as guides, however, and are rarely dispositive. Id.
Further, some courts have looked to state law in determining whether to recognize a
federal law privilege, noting that "a strong policy of comity between state and federal sover-
eignties impels federal courts to recognize state privileges where this can be accomplished at
no substantial cost to federal substantive and procedural policy." Id. (quoting United States
v. King, 73 F.R.D. 103, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 563 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 918 (1978)).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
65. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 4.
1987] 1407
1408 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1397
meaningful litigation under the federal statute by refusing to allow
the university's claim of "confidentiality" to circumvent the legis-
lative purpose of protecting minority academicians as fully as mi-
nority factory workers or custodial employees."' Accordingly, the
courts must acknowledge that the discussion and the commentary
that accompany one's consideration for promotion or tenure may
be the most important factors behind a decision that the plaintiff
asserts was motivated by discrimination." An outright judicial re-
fusal to allow discovery could effectively deny the extended appli-
cation of Title VII that Congress intended.
Courts also must assess the interests of the academic defend-
ant in maintaining an effective peer review system for employment
decisions.6 9 Collegial decisionmaking and review by one's peers
comprise a time-honored system of faculty governance. 0 Commen-
67. The legislative history to the 1972 extensions shows clearly the importance of Title
VII protection in the academic context:
The committee feels that discrimination in educational institutions is especially criti-
cal. The committee cannot imagine a more sensitive area than educational institutions
where the Nation's youth are exposed to a multitude of ideas that will strongly influ-
ence their future development. To permit discrimination here would, more than in any
other area, tend to promote misconceptions leading to future patterns of discrimina-
tion. Accordingly, the committee feels that educational institutions, like other employ-
ers in the Nation, should report their activities to the Commission and should be sub-
ject to the provisions of the Act.
H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
Naws 2137, 2155.
68. See, e.g., Corngold, Title VII and Confidentiality in the University, 12 J.L. &
EDUC. 587, 599 (1983). The writer notes:
A court that decides to keep such materials confidential determines, in effect, that
Congress, in prohibiting discrimination by colleges and universities, exempted discrimi-
nation that occurs in closed faculty meetings or in peer evaluations. But since the peer-
review process is the locus of potentially discriminatory hiring, firing and retention
decisions, such an approach would largely nullify the effectiveness of Title VII for
faculty plaintiffs.
Id.
69. In the typical peer review process, the tenure applicant's department head, with a
department committee, obtains statements and evidence from the applicant supporting the
applicant's position. The committee next solicits written evaluations of the applicant's
scholarship, teaching, and service from both inside and outside the university. The commit-
tee considers the evidence and votes by secret ballot to determine whether to recommend
that the applicant be granted tenure. The committee submits its recommendation to the
department chair, who forwards it with a recommendation to the dean of the college in-
volved and the university provost, who in turn make their recommendations to the univer-
sity president, who ultimately decides whether to grant or deny tenure. Confidentiality of
the views expressed accords with long-standing tradition. See, e.g., EEOC v. University of
Notre Dame du Lac, 715 F.2d 331, 333-34 n.1 (7th Cir. 1983).
70. See, e.g., Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1980). The court
stressed the importance of faculty interaction in employment decisions:
[I]t is beyond cavil that generally faculty employment decisions comprehend discre-
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tators who oppose allowing discovery of review files and committee
votes argue that disclosure could lead to a loss of candor in evalu-
ating one's co-workers out of fear that adverse comments will later
be divulged.7 1 A relevant University of Chicago faculty report
quoted by one commentator clearly expresses the institution's be-
lief that assured confidentiality is vital to the maintenance of
frank, balanced commentary and evaluation necessary for effective
peer review. 72 The report further states that, without some guaran-
tee of privacy, outside experts who are asked to make evaluations
will be reluctant or less candid for fear of the reaction if disclosure
should occur.73 The academic defendant, therefore, asserts that
tionary academic determinations which do entail review of the intellectual work prod-
uct of the candidate. That decision is most effectively made within the university and
although there may be tension between the faculty and the administration on their
relative roles and responsibilities, it is generally acknowledged that the faculty has at
least the initial, if not the primary, responsibility for judging candidates . . . . [T]he
peer review system has evolved as the most reliable method for assuring promotion of
the candidates best qualified to serve the needs of the institution.
Id. at 547-48 (citing Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh, 435 F. Supp. 1328, 1346 (W.D. Pa.
1977)).
71. See Lee, supra note 54, at 302-03.
72. Id. The writer quotes the Report of the Committee on Confidentiality in Matters
of Faculty Reappointment, U. CHL REC. 165 (May 22, 1979).
[I]n a collegial form of administration the process of decision depends on rational per-
suasion and concern for the common good. When difficult choices must be made in a
group in which there are disagreements about the merits of alternatives, it is vital that
deliberation be conducted with as full and open a discussion as possible among the
members. Frankness in speaking one's mind to one's colleagues is essential for the col-
legial system to work well ...
Nowhere is the expectation of confidentiality more important than in the appoin-
tive process. Because members must work with one another as peers over a number of
years, and in the case of tenure appointments perhaps over a number of decades, the
utmost candor is essential in the evaluative process. Once a decision is reached, those
who opposed as well as those who supported the decision must join together to carry it
out. Confidentiality of the deliberations by members of the deliberative body and by
those within the University to whom recommendations are transmitted is necessary for
effective self-government of a university organized on a collegial basis.
73. Id. This premise is supported in a letter to the University of California, Berkeley,
from an outside evaluator, exerpted in Smith, Protecting the Confidentiality of Faculty
Peer Review Records: Department of Labor v. The University of California, 8 J.C. & U.L. 20
(1981-82):
I want to make it perfectly clear that this is a confidential assessment, and is not to be
regarded otherwise. If it should turn out that your attempt to maintain confidentiality
breaks down, then you must delete this letter from your file and make no further use of
it. If you then wish support from me in the form of a letter that can be shown to the
candidate, then you should write to me again asking for me to put on paper a suitably
bland version of my opinion of the case. I take it, however, that what you are asking for
at the moment is a really thorough and frank assessment which it would, in my view be
quite inappropriate to give to the candidate, and I want you plainly to understand that
you are in no circumstances to do that.
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confidential peer review is not contrary to the desire for fair em-
ployment practices, but instead actually deters discriminatory
practices in the public interest by fostering decisions based upon
relevant, candid evaluations of qualifications and job skills.74
In considering a claim of qualified privilege, the court ulti-
mately must balance the parties' interests and determine whether
the public interest propounded by the university overrides the
plaintiff's private employment interest, compelling recognition of
the privilege. In keeping with the judiciary's inherent reluctance to
create evidentiary privileges, 75 courts have required that a privilege
be essential for the protection of the asserted interest.76 The Su-
preme Court in Trammel v. United States7 7 denied a claimed priv-
ilege on the ground that it was unnecessary. The lower court con-
victed Trammel on federal drug charges primarily through the
testimony of his wife, an unindicted co-conspirator. 78 Trammel had
asserted a privilege to prevent his wife from testifying against
him.7 '9 The district court agreed that confidential communications
were privileged, but allowed the wife to testify about acts she had
observed during the marriage and conversations made in the pres-
ence of third persons.8 0 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that
common law precedent prohibiting a wife's testimony against her
husband did not prevent the court from shifting the privilege to
the witness spouse only and allowing her voluntary testimony to be
heard.81 Noting that the traditional justification for the privilege
Id. at 22 n.9. One commentator points out that this "chilling effect" on candid evaluations
and voting could seriously impair the efficacy of the peer review system. See Kroll, supra
note 39, at 114-15. Decisionmakers, realizing that evaluations are inherently less trustworthy
as they become less candid, will refuse to rely on them as objective evidence of a candidate's
qualifications. Id. at 115. Decisions instead will be based on incomplete information, ad hoc
personal appraisals, and informal conversations that are themselves discriminatory, see
Corngold, supra note 68, at 601 n.67, and debilitative to the pursuit of superlative instruc-
tion and scholarship. See Kroll, supra note 39, at 115.
74. See Note, supra note 18, at 1559-60.
75. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
76. See Note, supra note 18, at 1560 (stating that "[t]o do otherwise would be to incur
the costs of the privilege without realizing a correlative increase in benefits").
77. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
78. Id. at 43.
79. Id. at 42.
80. Id. at 43.
81. Id. In its most recent ruling on spousal privilege prior to Trammel, Hawkins v.
United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958), the Court had left the federal privilege for adverse
spousal testimony in its common law state, continuing "a rule which bars the testimony of
one spouse against the other unless both consent." Id. at 78. The Trammel court relied on




relied on its role in fostering marital harmony,82 the Supreme
Court held that vesting the privilege in the witness spouse, who
may testify if he or she volunteers, would continue to further the
public interest in marital harmony while eradicating unnecessary
burdens on law enforcement.83 Because the witness spouse in
Trammel testified of her own accord, the Court held the spousal-
testimony privilege for the non-witness spouse to be unnecessary
to protect marital harmony. The asserted privilege therefore did
not promote interests sufficiently important to outweigh the need
to obtain probative evidence in criminal trials.s4
Thus, in order for the materials sought to be deemed pre-
sumptively privileged in the peer review context, the court must
find that confidentiality is necessary to further sufficiently impor-
tant interests. Courts in a number of analogous contexts have bal-
anced the asserted interests and found the need for confidentiality
to predominate. Certain socially important relationships have been
found to subsist meaningfully only on a diet of open communica-
tion guaranteed by assured confidentiality.85 For example, confi-
dential disclosures made by a client to his attorney in order to ob-
tain legal assistance are privileged. s6 This privilege encourages
clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys without fear of
divulgence.8 7 The Supreme Court in Fisher v. United States",
noted that without such a privilege a client, knowing that damag-
ing information could be obtained from his attorney even though
the client himself could not be forced to reveal it, would be reluc-
tant to confide in his lawyer, depriving himself of fully informed
legal advice. 89
A similar attempt by the courts to foster open communication
in an atmosphere free from fear of forced disclosure is evidenced
82. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44.
83. Id. at 53.
84. Id. at 51.
85. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (attorney-client); Blau
v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951) (husband-wife); Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275
(D.C. Cir. 1958) (priest-penitent).
86. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403; see also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 87; J. WIGMORE,
supra note 61, § 2292.
87. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403; see also United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 976 (1964); Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960); Schwim-
mer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1952); Prichard v.
United States, 181 F.2d 326 (6th Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 339 U.S. 974 (1950); Modern Wood-
men of Am. v. Watkins, 132 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1942).
88. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
89. Id. at 403.
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by judicial recognition of a priest-penitent privilege.90 In Trammel
v. United States"' the Supreme Court stated that such a privilege
furthers the human need to obtain, in confidence, guidance and
consolation from a spiritual counselor.2 Even in the context of
these recognized interests of broad social import, however, the
Court has been careful to apply a privilege only when necessary.
9 3
An analogy might be drawn between judicial recognition of an
academic privilege and earlier privileges allowed on grounds of pre-
serving the public's interest in open communication.9 4 The "execu-
tive or official information" privilege protects opinions or recom-
mendations of governmental officials in making decisions and
setting policy.95 The Supreme Court in United States v. Nixon96
recognized the detriment caused to the decisionmaking process by
the human tendency to temper candor on behalf of self-interest
when public dissemination of one's remarks is expected.9 7 In hold-
ing presidential communications presumptively privileged, there-
fore, the Court acknowledged the public stake in candid, objective,
blunt, or harsh opinions within the context of executive decisions.98
The Court stated that the President and his aides must be free to
explore alternatives when making decisions with the expectation
that the process will remain confidential. 9
90. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980); United States v. Wells,
446 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1971); Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1958); In re
Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
91. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
92. Id. at 51.
93. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403. Courts also have construed strictly the basic requirements
for a privileged communication. In United States v. Gordon, 493 F. Supp. 822 (N.D.N.Y.
1980), aff'd, 655 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1981), the district court refused to hold as privileged
conversations between the defendant and a priest when the priest held an executive position
in defendant's company, the defendant knew the priest to be on leave from the priesthood,
and the statements were related to business matters. 493 F. Supp. at 823-24.
94. See Note, supra note 18, at 1559.
95. Deleted FED. R. EvID. 509, 56 F.R.D. 251, 253 (1972) (advisory committee's notes).
96. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
97. Id. at 705.
98. Id. at 708.
99. Id. In finding a qualified privilege, the Court rejected Nixon's claim of absolute
privilege based on a need for confidentiality in high level communications. The Court
stated:
The President's need for complete candor and objectivity from advisers calls for great
deference from the courts. However, when the privilege depends solely on the broad,
undifferentiated claim of public interest in the confidentiality of such conversations, a
confrontation with other values arises. Absent a claim of need to protect military, dip-
lomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, we find it difficult to accept the argument
that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications
is significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection
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Other courts have arrived at similar findings when considering
the requested discovery of internal evaluations performed by hos-
pitals to ensure that high professional standards of patient care are
upheld. 100 In Bredice v. Doctors Hospital, Inc.01 the plaintiff in a
malpractice action sought to discover the minutes and reports of
medical staff reviews made by a committee of doctors at the hospi-
tal. The hospital stated that the sole purpose of the staff meetings
was to improve the care and treatment available to patients, em-
phasizing that the committee performed its work with the express
understanding that all communications would remain confiden-
tial.10 2 The court accepted the correlation between educating doc-
tors through discussions and improving patient care.'0 3 Noting that
the value of the proceedings would be destroyed if discovery of
minutes and participant identities was allowed, 04 the court stated
that upholding the public interest is a valid ground for prohibiting
discovery into certain matters. The court stated that the doctors'
responsibility to make life and death decisions mandates unim-
peded access to up-to-date techniques and information. The court
recognized an "overwhelming public interest" in allowing the staff
meetings to be held on a confidential basis, preserving a free flow
of ideas and advice between the doctors.
0 5
The defendant asserted a similar "self-evaluation" privilege in
Rosario v. New York Times Co., 0 6 a class action suit brought
against a daily newspaper alleging employment discrimination.
The New York Times refused to produce a number of documents,
which the newspaper claimed consisted of a self-evaluation of its
with all the protection that a district court will be obliged to provide.
Id. at 706; see also In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Sec. Litig., 478 F. Supp. 577 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)
(recognizing an official information privilege for opinions and recommendations, but not
purely factual material, in Office of the Comptroller of the Currency reports).
100. See, e.g., Mewborn v. Heckler, 101 F.R.D. 691 (D.D.C. 1984); Bredice v. Doctors
Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970), af'd, 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
101. 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970), afl'd, 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
102. Id. at 250.
103. Id.
104. Id. The court stated:
Confidentiality is essential to effective functioning of these staff meetings; and these
meetings are essential to the continued improvement in the care and treatment of pa-
tients. Candid and conscientious evaluation of clinical practices is a sine qua non of
adequate hospital care. To subject these discussions and deliberations to the discovery
process, without a showing of exceptional necessity, would result in terminating such
deliberations.
Id.
105. Id. at 251.
106. 84 F.R.D. 626, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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compliance with affirmative action requirements. 10 7 Following in
camera inspection, the court agreed, in the interest of free discus-
sion aimed at compliance with the law, to protect the documents
from discovery. 08
It is evident, therefore, that common law precedent exists rec-
ognizing a qualified privilege based upon the public's interest in,
and benefit from, candid communication and evaluation free from
fear of disclosure during litigation. A court considering a proposed
academic privilege must determine therefore whether that public
interest outweighs the disappointed academician's desire for full
disclosure of the deliberation process, bearing in mind that no
privilege should be recognized unless it is necessary to protect the
public interest at stake.
D. Plaintiff's Rebuttal of the Presumption of Privilege
Even if a court recognizes a qualified academic privilege on
either constitutional'0 9 or common law'10 grounds, the university's
battle is only half won. The plaintiff still may rebut the presump-
tion of privilege. The court, then, must undertake a second balanc-
ing of interests, even if the court finds that the defendant's need
for confidentiality generally should prevail. In United States v.
Nixon,"' for example, the Supreme Court first found a qualified
privilege for Presidential communications," 2  then examined
whether that privilege should stand in the context of criminal
prosecution presented by the facts of the case.1 3 The Court de-
scribed the process as a balancing of the President's interest in
protecting communications made in the performance of his duties
107. Id. at 631.
108. Id. For other cases recognizing an "evaluative" privilege, see Gillman v. United
States, 53 F.R.D. 316, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) and Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 53 F.R.D.
283, 285 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
109. See supra notes 14-38 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 58-108 and accompanying text.
111. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
112. Id. at 705-07; see also supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
113. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 711-12. The Court limited its holding to the criminal context:
We are not here concerned with the balance between the President's generalized inter-
est in confidentiality and the need for relevant evidence in civil litigation, nor with that
between the confidentiality interest and congressional demands for information, nor
with the President's interest in preserving state secrets. We address only the conflict
between the President's assertion of a generalized privilege of confidentiality and the
constitutional need for relevant evidence in criminal trials.
Id. at 712 n.19.
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against the fair administration of criminal justice. 14 The Court
concluded that presidential advisors would not temper the candor
of their statements merely because evidence of such conversations
possibly could be called for in a criminal prosecution.1 1 5 The Court
did find, however, that withholding relevant evidence in a criminal
trial through blanket protection of presidential communications
would seriously threaten the constitutional guarantees of due pro-
cess and impair the basic function of the courts. 6 The Court ex-
plained that while a President's need for confidentiality in commu-
nications is general in nature, the need for production of relevant
evidence in a criminal proceeding is specific and often central to a
fair adjudication of the case. Denying access to specific facts may
totally frustrate a criminal prosecution. 1 7 The Court held that lim-
ited disclosure of only those conversations shown to have some im-
pact on the criminal trial would not vitiate the office's general reli-
ance on confidentiality."
8
The traditional need for freely accessible evidence in criminal
proceedings also has led the Court to allow discovery over the as-
sertion of privilege by persons involved in the newsgathering pro-
cess. 19 Newsgathering, like academic freedom, implicates the first
amendment, 20 providing a constitutional foundation for the claim
of privilege.' 2 ' Like the official information privilege, 22 the
newsgathering privilege has yielded when the need for information
relevant to criminal prosecution is found to outweigh the need for
confidentiality. 12 3 Civil plaintiffs, however, also have demonstrated
114. See id. at 711-12.
115. Id. at 712.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 713.
119. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436
U.S. 547 (1978); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
120. Compare Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681 (stating that without some protection for
newsgathering, the first amendment freedom of the press could be eviscerated) with Regents
of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (noting that academic freedom has long
been "viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment").
121. Under traditional first amendment doctrine, constitutional rights secured by the
first amendment "cannot be infringed absent a 'compelling' or 'paramount' state interest."
Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 784 (2d Cir. 1972) (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973)).
122. See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
123. In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), the Court found the public interest
in law enforcement and effective grand jury proceedings sufficient to override "the conse-
quential, but uncertain, burden on news gathering that is said to result from insisting that
reporters, like other citizens, respond to relevant questions put to them in the course of a
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a need for information sufficiently compelling to overcome the as-
sertion of the newsgathering privilege.
12 4
In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.12 5 the Tenth Circuit ad-
dressed how a trial court should proceed when faced with a consti-
tutionally derived newsgathering privilege in the discovery phase
of civil litigation. 2 6 The dispute arose when the defendant corpo-
ration ordered a non-party witness to produce confidential infor-
mation he had obtained while investigating the death of Kerr-Mc-
Gee employee Karen Silkwood as the subject for a documentary
film. 127 In denying the filmmaker's request for a protective order,
the trial court failed to balance the opposing interests and to con-
sider the existence of a qualified privilege for newspersons. 12 The
court of appeals first noted that the Supreme Court had never lim-
ited the privilege to newspaper reporting 29 and concluded that the
implicated first amendment interests entitled the filmmaker to in-
voke the privilege.13 0 The appellate court remanded the case, in-
structing the trial court to balance the interests in accordance with
the criteria laid down in Garland v. Torre'' and subsequently re-
affirmed in Baker v. F & F Investment.
3 2
valid grand jury investigation or criminal trial." Id. at 690-91. The Court similarly rejected a
press claim for special protection from law enforcement demands for information in Zurcher
v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), upholding an ex parte warrant authorizing the
search of a campus newspaper office for photographs of a demonstration.
124. See, e.g., Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.) (libel action), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 910 (1958). But see Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972) (refusing to compel
disclosure in civil action), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973).
125. 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977).
126. Id. at 437-39.
127. Id. at 434. The filmmaker had assured interviewees, who demanded confidential-
ity, that both the information and their identities would be shielded from disclosure. Id. at
435.
128. Id. The trial court held that the filmmaker was not entitled to invoke the privi-
lege because he was not a newsman regularly engaged in obtaining, writing, editing, or oth-
erwise preparing news. Id. at 436.
129. Id. at 437 (citing Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1935)).
130. Silkwood, 563 F.2d at 437.
131. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
132. 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973).
In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. the court delineated the Garland criteria as:
1. Whether the party seeking information has independently attempted to obtain the
information elsewhere and has been unsuccessful.
2. Whether the information goes to the heart of the matter.
3. Whether the information is of certain relevance.
4. The type of controversy.
563 F.2d at 438. This analysis is intended to rule out "compulsory disclosure in the course of
a fishing expedition." Id. Despite generally broad discovery rules in the federal courts, see
supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text, this test requires "certain relevance." Silkwood,
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In Garland the Second Circuit ordered disclosure of the iden-
tity of a news source in a libel action. 133 A columnist had published
allegedly defamatory statements about actress Judy Garland, at-
tributing the statements to an unnamed CBS executive.134 The
writer refused to reveal her source at a pretrial deposition, claim-
ing a journalist's privilege.'35 The court held the writer in con-
tempt and ordered disclosure, focusing on Miss Garland's unsuc-
cessful attempts to determine the identity from alternate
sources. 36 According to the court, the identity of the news source
was essential to the libel action and went "to the heart of the
plaintiff's claim.'
3 7
The Second Circuit reached a different result under the same
analysis in Baker v. F & F Investment. 38 Baker was a civil rights
class action filed against Chicago realtors who allegedly engaged in
racially discriminatory sales practices. 139 The plaintiffs deposed a
journalist who had written an article about discriminatory
"blockbusting" based on an interview with a Chicago realtor to
whom the journalist had promised confidentiality. 40 The court fol-
lowed the Garland criteria in holding that the plaintiffs could not
compel disclosure of the confidential source. The court first noted
that the deposed journalist, unlike the writer in Garland, was not a
party to the action.14 ' Further, the plaintiffs had not sought the
information from other available sources. 42 The court concluded
that disclosure by the journalist of his source was neither essential
to the outcome of the case nor necessary to uphold public interest
in the fair administration of justice.143 The court also rejected the
plaintiffs' argument that the mere presence of a claim brought
563 F.2d at 436.
133. 259 F.2d at 550.
134. Id. at 547.
135. Id.
136. Id. Miss Garland had deposed two CBS executives who denied either making the
statement or having knowledge of who did. Id.
137. Id. at 550. Even in requiring disclosure, however, the court emphasized that its
holding was strictly limited to the facts of the case. The court noted that it was "not dealing
here with use of the judicial process to force a wholesale disclosure of a newspaper's confi-
dential sources of news, nor with a case where the identity of the news source is of doubtful
relevance or materiality." Id. at 549-50.
138. 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973).
139. Id. at 780.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 783.
142. Id.




under the federal civil rights acts provides a compelling justifica-
tion for overriding the journalist's privilege.1
4 4
Thus, in overcoming a qualified academic privilege in a dis-
crimination suit, the plaintiff must show an overriding need for the
information that goes to the heart of the matter, demonstrate the
information's certain relevance, and prove the absence of alterna-
tive, less intrusive sources of the information. On balance, the
plaintiff must prove sufficient danger to his rights and sufficient
need for the information to override the university's need for confi-
dentiality recognized in the court's grant of qualified privilege. 14 5
The Supreme Court has held that discovery rules are to be
accorded broad and liberal treatment, particularly where proof of
intent is required. 4 6 Historically, discrimination suits against aca-
demic employers were limited to suits against public institutions
brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 41 which requires a
finding of discriminatory intent." 8 The 1972 extension of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,'149 however, rendered virtually all colleges and
universities vulnerable to discrimination suits. Most such suits
take the form of Title VII disparate treatment actions 50 alleging
different treatment of individuals based exclusively on their sex,
race, religion, or national origin. The Supreme Court articulated
the general requirements for establishing a prima facie case of dis-
144. Id. at 782-83. The court stated:
This argument, we believe, goes too far, for it would require disclosure of confidential
sources in every case based upon federal question jurisdiction or, at least, in every case
raising a claim under the civil rights acts. We can see no justification for either a blan-
ket rule covering all federal question cases, or for a partial rule of disclosure for all civil
rights actions.
Id. at 783.
145. See Note, supra note 18, at 1563-64. Although the fact that the information is
sought in furtherance of a civil rights claim does not itself entitle the plaintiff to unlimited
discovery, see supra note 144 and accompanying text, the needs of a plaintiff in a discrimi-
nation suit should be considered in determining the necessity of forced disclosure of confi-
dential peer review materials. The review files or votes arguably would go to "the heart of
the matter" if the plaintiff would be unable to prove an essential element of his case without
them.
146. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). One commentator has noted that even under § 1983's
long standing protection of public university faculty members, courts have been reluctant to
examine faculty peer review decisions. See Lee, supra note 58, at 279.
148. See General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391
(1982).
149. See supra note 4.
150. See Yurko, Judicial Recognition of Academic Collective Interests: A New Ap-
proach to Title VII Litigation, 60 B.U.L. REv. 473, 482-83 (1980).
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parate treatment in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.151 The
Court expressly approved these standards for use in Title VII cases
involving academic employment in Board of Trustees of Keene
State College v. Sweeney.152 In an academic setting, the McDon-
nell Douglas test requires a showing that: (1) the plaintiff is a
member of a minority or disadvantaged class; (2) the plaintiff
sought a position for which he or she was qualified; (3) the plaintiff
was rejected, and (4) the institution filled the position with an ap-
plicant of plaintiff's qualifications or promoted other persons with
similar qualifications at approximately the same time.
153
The plaintiff, therefore, initially carries a minimal burden in
compelling the defendant to raise a defense. 54 Direct proof of dis-
criminatory intent is not necessary;155 a plaintiff must prove only
that she was denied an available position for which she was quali-
fied. '5 Once a prima facie case is established, the defendant must
show a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for rejecting the
employee. 57 The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff, who
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the justifica-
tions offered by the defendant differ from the defendant's true mo-
tivation. 5 " The plaintiff meets her burden of persuasion by prov-
ing either that "a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the
151. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The Court required the plaintiff to prove:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job
for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he
was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the em-
ployer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
Id. at 802. The Court stated that the test was sufficiently flexible to allow its extension to
other Title VII actions. "The facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specifica-
tion of the prima facie proof required ... is not necessarily applicable in every respect to
differing factual situations." Id. at 802 n.13; see also Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (stating that the McDonnell Douglas formulation was "not intended to
be an inflexible rule").
152. 439 U.S. 24 (1978).
153. Smith v. University of N.C., 632 F.2d 316, 340 (4th Cir. 1980).
154. See, e.g., Friedman, Congress, the Courts, and Sex-Based Employment Discrimi-
nation in Higher Education: A Tale of Two Titles, 34 VAND. L. REv. 37, 43 (1981).
155. See Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 1980).
156. See Friedman, supra note 154, at 43. In order to meet the second step of the
McDonnell Douglas test, the plaintiff must establish only that she was sufficiently qualified
to be among those persons from whom a selection would be made. See Banerjee v. Board of
Trustees of Smith College, 495 F. Supp. 1148, 1155-56 (D. Mass. 1980) (stating that the
plaintiff "need only show that his qualifications were at least sufficient to place him in the
middle group of tenure candidates as to whom both a decision granting tenure and a deci-
sion denying tenure could be justified as a reasonable exercise of discretion by the tenure
decision-making body"), aff'd, 648 F.2d 61 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981).
157. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
158. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
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employer"'15 9 or that the employer's justification is "unworthy of
credence.' 60 In any disparate treatment action, then, some proof
of discriminatory intent ultimately is critical.'
6
1
Thus, in determining whether to recognize a plaintiff's rebut-
tal of a university's presumptive privilege for confidential material,
a court must consider whether the information sought goes "to the
heart of the matter" 62-that is, toward proof of discriminatory in-
tent. The court must analyze the plaintiff's efforts to obtain proof
from any alternate sources and determine whether the requested
material is of "certain relevance"' 6 3 in proving that the defendant's
asserted reasons for its employment decision were mere pretext.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. In re Dinnan
In 1981 the Fifth Circuit in In re Dinnan1" became the first
federal appellate court to consider a university's assertion of an
academic freedom privilege.' 65  The case arose when Maija
Blaubergs, a female faculty member, was denied promotion to the
rank of associate professor.6 6 During discovery Professor James
Dinnan, a member of Blaubergs' review committee, refused to an-
swer when asked how he had voted on the application.'67 Dinnan's
refusal ultimately led to a contempt citation, 68 which on appeal to
159. Id. at 256.
160. Id.
161. See Friedman, supra note 154, at 44 (citing International Bd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981)). Professor
Joel Friedman notes the difficulty that the plaintiff, usually forced to rely on less persuasive
circumstantial evidence, encounters in proving the requisite intent because she "must ask
the judge to find that a subjective evaluation, rendered by a professional in an area that
frequently is outside the judge's areas of expertise, is really on a pretext asserted to camou-
flage the defendant's true motive-discrimination." Id. at 48.
162. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
163. Id.
164. 661 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
165. The court stated that the "appellant is claiming a privilege, i.e., a right to refrain




168. The case attracted much comment in the academic community. One writer re-
ports that, "On July 3, 1980, dressed in academic regalia to show that the government was
'locking up the University of Georgia,' Professor Dinnan turned himself in to federal mar-
shals. He served a three month sentence and was fined $3,000." Comment, supra note 58, at
286 n.2 (citing Jailed Professor Wins Release, Chron. Higher Educ., Oct 14, 1980, at 5, col.
5).
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the Fifth Circuit was coupled with an appeal from the trial court's
order compelling discovery.16
The court of appeals summarily dismissed Dinnan's privilege
claim based upon academic freedom,170 calling Dinnan's position a
"gross distortion" of the facts.171 Considering the problem to be
evidentiary only, the court refused to agree that compelled discov-
ery implicated any issue of constitutional dimension.1 1 2 The court
recognized the importance of academic freedom generally, 73 but
emphasized that an employment decision allegedly made on non-
academic grounds removes the entire decisionmaking process from
its otherwise constitutionally protected realm.7 4 The court con-
cluded that the importance of finding the truth outweighed the
privilege claimed by Dinnan.
175
The court further recognized that academic freedom, despite
its historical importance, is limited. The court stated that Dinnan
and the University of Georgia deserved no exemption from the
fundamental public policy prohibiting discrimination. 76 The Fifth
Circuit rejected Dinnan's protestations that a loss of confidential-
ity would inhibit decisionmakers, stating that the court's decision
would encourage responsible, good faith decisionmaking by depriv-
ing wrongdoers of a constitutionally protected hiding place behind
a shield of academic freedom.1
77
169. In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d at 427.
170. The court also rejected Dinnan's claim that the common law secret ballot privi-
lege protected his vote, reserving that privilege for votes in political or politically related
elections. Id. at 431-32. The court found neither argument "to be even slightly persuasive."
Id. at 430.
171. Id. at 427.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 430-31. The court stated that "government should stay out of academic
affairs" but emphasized that the instant situation involved not academic issues, but "a pri-
vate plaintiff. . . attempting to enforce her constitutional and statutory rights in an em-
ployment situation." Id. at 430 (emphasis omitted).
174. The court pointed out that Justice Frankfurter's "four essential freedoms," com-
monly cited as grounds for academic freedom in the employment area, were premised on a
university's determination being made "on academic grounds." Id. at 431 (citing Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978)).
175. Id. at 432-33. The court stated that to hold otherwise would allow a claim of
academic freedom to shield even those tenure committee votes totally devoid of legitimate
academic basis. Id. at 431. The court called that possibility "a much greater threat to our
liberty and academic freedom than the compulsion of discovery in the instant case." Id.
176. Id. The court noted that "[tlo rule otherwise would mean that the concept of
academic freedom would give any institution of higher learning carte blanche to practice
discrimination of all types." Id.
177. Id. at 432. The court criticized Dinnan for being unwilling to accept responsibility
for his own actions:
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B. Gray v. Board of Higher Education
The next assertion of an academic freedom privilege came in
Gray v. Board of Higher Education.178 Dr. S. Simpson Gray, a
black instructor for five years at a New York community college,
brought suit under 42 U.S.C. sections 1981, 1983, and 1985 after he
was refused promotion and reappointment with tenure.179 Gray
sought to discover the votes of two members of the committee that
had considered his promotion, arguing that the evidence was mate-
rial and essential to his case. 80 The defendants claimed that their
votes were protected under a first amendment qualified academic
privilege.' 8 The district court recognized a qualified privilege,
holding that the confidentiality of the faculty peer review system
should be fostered because protection of the tenure system is es-
sential to the protection of individual teachers' academic free-
dom.18 2 In refusing to compel discovery, the district court applied
the Garland v. Torre factors, 8 3 finding that the action was civil in
nature, the information sought by Gray was available from other
sources, and the information was not clearly relevant.'
On appeal the Second Circuit refused to adopt a rule of privi-
lege, not because the defendants failed to show a compelling justi-
fication for privilege, but because the court found that on balance
the facts of the case leaned toward allowing discovery. 85 The court
Persons occupying positions of responsibility, like Dinnan, often must make difficult
decisions. The consequence of such responsibility is that occasionally the deci-
sionmaker will be called upon to explain his actions. In such a case, he must have the
courage to stand up and publicly account for his decision. If that means that a few
weak-willed individuals will be deterred from serving in positions of public trust, so be
it; society is better off without their services. If the decisionmaker has acted for legiti-
mate reasons, he has nothing to fear. We find nothing heroic or noble about [Dinnan's]
position; we see only an attempt to avoid responsibility for his actions. If [Dinnan] was
unwilling to accept responsibility for his actions, he should never have taken part in
the tenure decision-making process.
Id.
178. 92 F.R.D. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 692 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1982).
179. Dr. Gray, under the college's established procedure, entered teaching at the in-
structor level, but was entitled to seek advancement to the rank of assistant professor after
one year. Gray, 692 F.2d at 902.
180. Id. at 903.
181. Id.
182. Gray, 92 F.R.D. at 92-94.
183. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
184. Gray, 692 F.2d at 903.
185. Id. at 904-05. The court voiced neither agreement nor disagreement with the re-
sult in In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982), but
stated that "the opinion accords too little weight to the concerns for confidentiality in the
academic tenure decision-making process." Gray, 692 F.2d at 904 n.6.
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of appeals stated that the district court had underestimated the
plaintiff's need to know individual votes because, unlike in Title
VII suits, a finding of discriminatory intent is required in section
1981 actions.' 6 The court also focused on the college's failure to
provide Gray with the reasons for the committee's decision.'87 The
court adopted the position proposed in an amicus curiae brief filed
by the American Association of University Professors (AAUP)'-"
suggesting that review decisions should be shielded from discovery
if accompanied by a detailed statement of reasons.' 9 Without a
statement of reasons, however, the AAUP found the balance in
favor of discovery, not privilege.' 90 Because the committee revealed
to Gray neither its votes nor its reasoning, the Second Circuit al-
lowed discovery in light of Gray's inability otherwise to prove the
requisite intent for a section 1981 action.' 91
C. EEOC v. University of Notre Dame du Lac
The Seventh Circuit's 1983 opinion in Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission v. University of Notre Dame du Lac 92 ex-
186. Gray, 692 F.2d at 905. The court noted that Dr. Gray might prove discriminatory
intent "if he could establish that [the individual defendants] harbored a racial animus
against him and that this was manifested in votes against his reappointment and ten-
ure-but to begin with he would, of course, have to know the votes." Id.
187. Id. at 905, 906-08.
188. The brief suggests that "'[i]f an unsuccessful candidate for reappointment or
tenure receives a meaningful written statement of reasons from the peer review committee
and is afforded proper intramural grievance procedures,' disclosure of individual votes
should be protected by a qualified privilege." Id. at 907 (quoting Brief for Amicus Curiae of
AAUP at 23).
189. Id. at 908. Adherence to the AAUP guidelines would protect academic freedom
because "the institution's substantial adherence to the principles and procedures. . . will in
many cases avert the need for judicially enforced discovery. In those circumstances . . . it
may be appropriate to assert a qualified academic peer review privilege." Id.
190. Id. The court stated that requiring disclosure of votes in the absence of stated
reasons may preserve the plaintiff's right to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
Id. The court noted, however, that if reasons were provided, the plaintiff's need for disclo-
sure may turn upon the nature of the reasons put forth:
If the defendants claim that the tenure denial was based on evaluations of Gray's per-
formance discussed at the [review committee] meeting, then certainly Gray will be
hamstrung if denied disclosure. If, in contrast, defendants claim that Gray was denied
tenure, say, because of poor student evaluations, a record of tardiness and missed clas-
ses, or failure to meet a requirement of publication, then disclosure may not be neces-
sary, for if these reasons were pretextual that can be proven without it.
Id. at 905.
191. Id. at 906. The court said: "[F]orced as Dr. Gray is to chase an invisible quarry,
without at least knowing the votes, he can hardly be said to have a 'full and fair opportu-
nity,' to demonstrate employment discrimination." Id.
192. 715 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1983).
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pressly recognized a qualified academic freedom privilege. 193 The
action originated from a charge filed with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) by a faculty member who had
been denied tenure, allegedly on the basis of race.19 4 The EEOC
issued an administrative subpoena duces tecum requiring the uni-
versity to produce files of the charging party and certain other
faculty members in his department.195 The university refused to
comply, arguing that the personnel files contained peer reviews
made with the assurance that they would remain confidential and
that, unredacted, the evaluations were protected from disclosure
by a qualified academic freedom privilege. 9 ' The district court re-
fused to allow the university to delete all names and identifying
features of the tenure review participants from the files, reasoning
that no harm would result from disclosure of the files because the
EEOC is statutorily prohibited' 97 from disclosing any file informa-
tion until a lawsuit is actually filed, even to the charging party.'98
The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding a quali-
fied privilege mandated by first amendment interests in fostering
candid, critical, objective, and thorough evaluations in the peer re-
view process. 9 9 The court of appeals directed the district court on
193. Id. at 337.
194. Id. The complainant stated in his EEOC charge that, inter alia, the university
had refused either to provide a written statement of reasons for denial or to disclose the
identities of internal or external reviewers. Id. at 332.
195. Id. The university had offered to produce the files subject to the EEOC signing
an agreement requiring that the EEOC maintain the confidentiality of the material, but the
EEOC refused and issued the subpoena duces tecum. Id. at 333.
196. Id. at 333-34.
197. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-8(e) (1982).
198. Notre Dame, 715 F.2d at 333-34. In reversing the district court decision, the Sev-
enth Circuit stated that the EEOC is not prohibited from disclosing the contents of investi-
gatory files to the charging party during investigation under the Supreme Court's holding in
EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590 (1981). Notre Dame, 715 F.2d at 337.
199. Notre Dame, 715 F.2d at 335-36. The court analogized peer review to other so-
cially important decisionmaking processes judicially recognized as deserving of protected
status:
Just as a limited executive privilege is necessary for the executive branch of our gov-
ernment to function properly, and as confidential judicial and jury deliberations are
essential to preserve the integrity of those processes, confidentiality is equally critical
in the faculty tenure selection process, in order that only the best qualified instructors
become the "lifeblood" of our institutions of higher learning.
Id. at 336-37.
The court recognized that some factors weighed in favor of disclosure, noting that a
privilege should not be used to prohibit completely the disclosure of review files. Such an
absolute privilege could shield evidence of discrimination and impair both the integrity of
the truth-seeking process and the efficacy of congressional goals of eradicating discrimina-
tion. The court further stated that the EEOC's investigatory powers should not be unduly
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remand to permit the university to redact the names and any other
identifying features of the evaluators from each file.200 The district
court would examine both the redactions and the original files in
camera to determine if the redactions were necessary; if so, the
redacted versions would be turned over to the EEOC and the origi-
nals sent back to the university.2 1 The EEOC could obtain further
disclosure from the files only by making "a substantial showing of
particularized need for relevant information. '" 20 2 The court of ap-
peals described the "particularized need" standard as varying in
proportion to the degree of access the party has to other sources of
information. In order to prevent "fishing expeditions" judicially
sanctioned through motions to compel discovery, the "particular-
ized need" standard requires a party to exploit every possible
source of information before seeking the privileged materials. 03
The court further stated that only a "compelling necessity" for the
specific information requested, not mere relevance or usefulness,
would satisfy the "particularized need" standard." 4
D. EEOC v. Franklin and Marshall College
The Third Circuit displayed a different view of the issue in
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Franklin and
Marshall College.20 5 The dispute arose out of the EEOC's investi-
gation of a charge of discrimination in violation of Title VII filed
by a French professor who had been denied tenure on the basis of
a college committee's recommendation citing "deficiencies in the
areas of scholarship and general contributions . . . not sufficiently
frustrated and recognized that academic freedom itself would be compromised if tenure de-
cisions could be made on unlawful grounds. Id. at 337.
200. Id. at 338. The court stressed that its opinion was not an endorsement of free
access to the EEOC to redacted files, but stated that this case was unique because the uni-
versity had volunteered to produce redacted files. The court noted that "there must be sub-
stance to the charging party's claim and thorough discovery conducted before even redacted
files are made available." Id. at 337 n.4.
201. Id. at 338.
202. Id. The court describes the burden as similar to that imposed on a party seeking
grand jury materials, requiring the court to conduct a balancing test to determine whether
the need of the party seeking disclosure outweighs the danger of infringement upon the
privilege's underlying policies. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.; see also supra note 132 and accompanying text (discussing the heightened
standard of "certain relevance" required to obtain privileged materials).
205. 775 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2288 (1986). Justices White
and Blackmun, dissenting in the denial of certiorari, stated that they would have heard the




offset by performance in other areas. ' ' The EEOC issued a sub-
poena duces tecum requesting materials from the personnel files of
the charging party and all individuals considered for tenure since
November 1977, offering to accept the materials with names and
identifying characteristics deleted.20 7 The college refused to comply
fully,208 and the district court issued the order to compel
compliance.
The court of appeals specifically declined to follow the Sev-
enth and Second Circuits, refusing to adopt either a qualified priv-
ilege or a balancing approach. 209 The court recognized the impor-
tance of confidentiality in obtaining candid, honest peer review in
educational settings, especially in a small school like Franklin and
Marshall where tenure applicants and tenure decisionmakers are in
continual contact.210 The court, however, relied on Congress' intent
to subject educational institutions to the same Title VII require-
ments applied in other industries and stated that the Seventh and
Second Circuits' positions allow educational institutions "to hide
discrimination behind a wall of secrecy."
211
Much of the court's opinion emphasizes the broad investiga-
tory power of the EEOC, which the court stated encompasses ac-
cess to anything that is relevant to the charge under investigation,
not merely that which might be relevant at trial.212 The court
noted that relevance is construed broadly in the investigatory
stage,213 citing the Supreme Court's view that courts must allow
the EEOC access to virtually any information that might prove or
206. Franklin & Marshall, 775 F.2d at 112.
207. Id.
208. Id. The college refused to provide materials including "tenure recommendation
forms prepared by faculty members, annual evaluations . . ., letters of reference, evalua-
tions of publications by outside experts, and all notes, letters, memoranda or other docu-
ments considered during each tenure decision." Id. at 112-13.
209. Id. at 114.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 115. The court stated that it could not ignore Congress' mandate and had
"no choice but to trust that the honesty and integrity of the tenured reviewers in evaluation
decisions will overcome feelings of discomfort and embarrassment and will outlast the de-
mise of absolute confidentiality." Id.
212. Id. The court relied largely upon the Supreme Court's decision in EEOC v. Shell
Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54 (1984), which "rejected the proposition that a district court must find
the charge of discrimination to be well-founded, verifiable, or based on reasonable suspicion
before enforcing an EEOC subpoena." Franklin & Marshall, 775 F.2d at 116 (citing Shell
Oil, 466 U.S. at 72 n.26, 77 n.33).
213. Franklin & Marshall, 775 F.2d at 116 (citing EEOC v. University of Pittsburgh,
643 F.2d 983, 986 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 880 (1981)).
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disprove the allegations against the employer.214 The Third Circuit
ordered the college to produce the redacted materials, concluding
that the EEOC should not attempt to reevaluate the candidate's
qualification-a task strictly in the realm of the college-but
should be free to investigate and intervene when decisions have
been based on statutorily impermissible grounds. 15
E. District Court Opinions
1. Zaustinsky v. University of California
In 1983 a federal district court in California" 6 found the con-
tents of a plaintiff's review file to be privileged communications. 217
Zaustinsky v. University of California"" involved a claim of sex
discrimination brought by a tenured faculty member denied pro-
motion to full professor. Zaustinsky sought discovery of her peer
evaluations, which had been written and submitted with an ex-
press expectation of confidentiality. 19 Although the university's
assertion of privilege was not premised expressly on the principles
214. Id. at 116 (citing Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 68-69). The Supreme Court in Shell Oil,
however, went on to note that the courts "must be careful not to construe the regulation
adopted by the EEOC governing what goes into a charge in a fashion that renders that
requirement [of relevancy] a nullity." 466 U.S. at 69.
215. Franklin & Marshall, 775 F.2d at 117. Chief Judge Aldisert, in a strongly worded
dissent, objected to the majority's automatic application of labor standards to the academic
setting as an abhorrent example of dogmatic "slot machine justice." Id. (Aldisert, C.J., dis-
senting). The Chief Judge disagreed with the majority's view that academic institutions are
the same as other employers:
At least insofar as their administrative and governance structures are concerned, col-
leges and universities differ significantly from garden variety private employers. In the
context of application of the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act the Su-
preme Court has counseled that "principles developed for use in the industrial setting
cannot be 'imposed blindly on the academic world.'"
775 F.2d at 120 (footnote and citations omitted) (quoting NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S.
672, 681 (1980)). The Chief Judge stated that he would adopt a flexible Gray-like balancing
approach, id. at 121, requiring the EEOC to show compelling necessity for the confidential
files of faculty members other than the charging party. Id.
216. Zaustinsky v. University of Cal., 96 F.R.D. 622 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd without
opinion, 782 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1985).
217. Zaustinsky, 96 F.R.D. at 625. The court used Wigmore's classic criteria for a
common law privilege, see supra note 61 and accompanying text, as a framework for its
discussion, finding each of the first three criteria met. First, the evaluations were submitted
with an expectation of confidentiality; second, confidentiality was essential to the effective-
ness of a faculty review system; and third, the peer review system deserved fostering as the
most reliable method for determining faculty appointments. 96 F.R.D. at 625.
218. 96 F.R.D. 622 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd without opinion, 782 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir.
1985).
219. Id. at 623.
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of academic freedom, the court looked to Gray22 ° for procedural
guidance. 21 The district court noted that a plaintiff, merely upon
filing a claim of discriminatory treatment, is not entitled to a "gen-
eral inquisition" into the university's files.22 The court stated that
the defendant must disclose the reasons for its action, after which
the plaintiff will be allowed to discover only those confidential
materials that reflect the reasons disclosed by the university, ena-
bling her to meet the burden of proving the defendant's reasons
pretextual 2 3 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court in 1985
without publishing an opinion.224
2. Rollins v. Farris
A more recent opinion addressing the privilege question is
Rollins v. Farris,2 11 an action based on discrimination claims under
Title VII and section 1983.26 The plaintiff sought discovery of ten-
ure files for various faculty members and minutes of the committee
meeting in which her application for tenure was considered. 2 7 In
considering the plaintiff's motion to compel production, the dis-
trict court reviewed the split of opinion in the federal circuits and
ordered the votes, minutes, and deliberations of the tenure review-
ing body produced when proof of discriminatory intent is neces-
sary to establish the plaintiff's claim or to rebut the defendant's
proof.2 8 The court specifically declined to follow the position of
the Seventh Circuit. 29 Expressly adopting the Third Circuit's
holding in Franklin and Marshall,2 30 the court found that discov-
220. 692 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1982).
221. Zaustinsky, 96 F.R.D. at 624.
222. Id. at 625.
223. Id.
224. Zaustinsky v. University of Cal., 782 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1985).
225. 108 F.R.D. 714 (E.D. Ark. 1985).
226. Id. at 715.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 719. The court stated that its stance would not give plaintiffs carte blanche
to discover confidential materials merely by alleging discrimination. The court held that
deliberations would be discoverable if the plaintiff alleged that the committee "harbors a
discriminatory animus against him," which would be reflected in the minutes, or if the de-
nial was premised on evaluations of the plaintiff's performance made at the meetings. Id.
The court noted, however, that disclosure may be unwarranted when the stated reasons for
denial are external to the committee's discussion and thus could be shown pretextual with-
out compelled discovery of the confidential records. Id.
229. Id. at 720 (citing EEOC v. University of Notre Dame du Lac, 715 F.2d at 331 (7th
Cir. 1983)).
230. 775 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2288 (1986).
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ery rules adequately protect the interests of academic freedom.81
The court noted, however, that the materials sought would have
been discoverable under the holdings of the Second,232 Third, 3 or
Fifth234 Circuits.
3. Jackson v. Harvard University
In Jackson v. Harvard University235 the Massachusetts federal
district court adopted the Seventh Circuit's "particularized need"
standard 23 6 in an action brought by a female business school
faculty member alleging sex discrimination in the tenure process.
The court affirmed a magistrate's order denying the disclosure of
the identities of faculty and peer reviewers who had furnished con-
fidential evaluations for use in the plaintiff's tenure review. 23 7 Ex-
pressly acknowledging the existence of a qualified academic privi-
lege,238 the court held that the plaintiff had failed to make a
showing of particularized need sufficient to overcome defendant's
privilege. 2 9 The court noted that the defendants previously had
produced a complete copy of the plaintiff's review file, including all
materials on which the denial of tenure was based.240 The court
further ordered the production of tenure files for male faculty
members receiving tenure within the relevant time frame of the
plaintiff's action.24 1 The court required, however, that any names
in files produced, including the plaintiff's own file, be redacted in
recognition of the university's interest in maintaining the confiden-
tiality of its tenure files and the identity of persons involved in the
tenure process.24 2
231. Rollins, 108 F.R.D. at 720. The defendants did not appeal the court's granting of
plaintiff's motion to compel. At trial, however, the defendants prevailed on the merits. Rol-
lins v. Farris, 40 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 1495 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 18, 1986), aff'd, No. 86-1367, slip
op. at 4 (8th Cir. May 4, 1987).
232. See Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., 692 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1982).
233. See EEOC v. Franklin & Marshall College, 775 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 2288 (1986).
234. See In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106
(1982).
235. 111 F.R.D. 472 (D. Mass. 1986).
236. Id. at 474; see supra note 202 and accompanying text.
237. Jackson, 111 F.R.D. at 474.
238. Id. (citing EEOC v. University of Notre Dame du Lac, 715 F.2d 331 (7th Cir.
1983)).
239. Id.
240. Id. at n.1.
241. Id. at 476.
242. Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
The present state of academic privilege law in the federal
courts plainly is unsettled. Each case requires the reviewing court
to reconcile an increasing number of equally relevant opinions.24 3
As Justices White and Blackmun stated in their dissent to the Su-
preme Court's denial of certiorari in Franklin and Marshall,244 the
High Court should take advantage of its next opportunity to re-
solve the split in the circuits and provide some coherent guidance
for the lower courts. In the interim, the lack of harmony among the
courts may create a "chilling effect" for academic decisionmakers
who desire the security of assured confidentiality before making
candid appraisals. 2" Such a judicially fostered infringement upon
freedoms derived from the first amendment 24 is intolerable when
the problem might be rectified through the articulation of clear,
cogent guidelines by which the lower courts may address academic
privilege issues.
A logical procedure for dealing with an asserted privilege in-
volves a two-step analysis. The first step, adopted by the Gray
court from the American Association of University Professors,
would find a qualified privilege for the confidential review materi-
als only when the institution has furnished a detailed written
statement of reasons to the faculty member denied appointment.247
The privilege could be based on either constitutional 248 or common
law24 9 grounds. A statement of reasons would satisfy the plaintiff's
243. Compare In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1981) (the first court to address
the issue of an academic privilege) with Rollins v. Farris, 108 F.R.D. 714 (E.D. Ark. 1985)
(district court in a circuit that had not yet addressed the issue and was forced to seek an
answer among conflicting views of four other circuits).
244. 106 S. Ct. 2288, 2289 (1986) (White & Blackmun, J.J., dissenting).
245. Obviously, most peer review committee members do not anticipate litigation
when they cast their votes for or against a fellow academician's appointment. However,
scholars admittedly may alter their opinions if divulgence is a possibility. See supra note 73
and accompanying text. Further, if a committee member is aware that a co-member does
harbor some discriminatory animus toward the candidate that could affect the committee's
decision, the committee member may well decide that discretion is the better part of valor
and make his own statements less frank. Id.
246. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (noting that
academic freedom has long been viewed as a special concern of the first amendment).
247. 692 F.2d at 908. The Gray court noted that requiring a statement of reasons
"may serve to avoid arbitrariness or lack of consideration in the decision-making body it-
self." Id. at 907. However, the reasons must be stated with sufficient specificity to allow a
plaintiff to disprove them. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258
(1981).
248. See supra notes 14-38 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 58-108 and accompanying text.
ACADEMIC FREEDOM PRIVILEGE
right to know the factors that entered into the decision to deny
appointment; absent a suitable statement, the privilege would not
be recognized, and the balance would tip in favor of discovery.10
Having recognized a qualified privilege, the court would then
turn to the second step: allowing the plaintiff to attempt to rebut
the presumption of privilege. 251 At this stage the courts would en-
force the congressional mandate to apply anti-discrimination stat-
utes to educational employers. If the denial of appointment was
based solely on the discussions of the tenure committee, such
materials go "to the heart of the matter"-proof of discriminatory
intent or pretext on the part of the defendant-and thus are dis-
coverable despite the qualified privilege.252 If, however, the plain-
tiff can make her case using alternative sources of information, or
if the reasons cited by the defendant otherwise can be proved
pretextual, or if the material is of uncertain relevance,253 discovery
will not be allowed, protecting institutional confidentiality from
groundless "fishing expeditions." This tripartite test of the plain-
tiff's need-whether the information (1) goes to the heart of the
matter, (2) is of certain relevance, and (3) is unavailable from other
sources 254-would protect a university's decision based upon legiti-
mate reasons but would pierce the veil of secrecy and allow dis-
criminatory motives and pretext to be exposed during litigation.
Furthermore, even if discovery occurs, the court may employ its
power to control discovery 255 through the use of protective devices
such as in camera review and redaction of names to protect
whatever harmony exists between individual committee members
and the disgruntled plaintiff, who may continue to work side by
side.
250. See, e.g., Gray, 692 F.2d at 908.
251. See supra notes 109-163 and accompanying text.
252. Id.
253. The test falls somewhere between Notre Dame's requirement of "particularized
need," 715 F.2d at 338, and Franklin & Marshall's adoption of the liberal interpretation of
"relevance" from cases involving processes of employment decisionmaking not implicating
first amendment principles. 775 F.2d at 116-17.
254. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text; see also Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders
Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1240 (6th Cir.) (commenting that effective management of complex
litigation requires allowing the district judge broad discretion in guiding the discovery pro-
cess), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981).
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V. CONCLUSION
A judicial clash between society's interest in first amendment
principles of academic freedom and the interest of an individual in
seeking and retaining the employment of his choice free from bias
and discrimination provides a predictably explosive mix of opin-
ions on which interest should prevail. Both interests are of para-
mount importance. Neither interest, however, should be deemed
absolute to the detriment of the other. Under a judicially man-
dated, yet flexible set of guidelines, courts may balance the com-
peting interests in order to provide fair and rational judicial out-
comes that are sadly lacking in the existing chaotic state of the law
within the federal circuits.
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